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Abstract
The paper develops models of statistical experiments that combine
propensities with frequencies, the underlying theory being the branch-
ing space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992). The models are then applied
to analyze Bell’s theorem. We prove the so-called Bell-CH inequality
via the assumptions of a BST version of Outcome Independence and
of (non-probabilistic) No Conspiracy. Notably, neither the condition
of probabilistic No Conspiracy nor the condition of Parameter Inde-
pendence is needed in the proof. As the Bell-CH inequality is most
likely experimentally falsified, the choice is this: contrary to the ap-
pearances, experimenters cannot choose some measurement settings,
or some transitions, with SLR initials, are correlated, or both.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is twofold.1 First, we will construct models that
accommodate both propensity aspects and frequentist aspects of statistical
experiments. A view underlying this task has it that on a given run of the
experiment, a measurement is capable of producing alternative outcomes, the
weights of such capacities being propensities. That is, the propensity of a
transition from a measurement to one of its outcomes is the measure of how
possible the transition is. The frequentist aspect consists in a desideratum
that observed frequencies of results should reflect the underlying propensities.
The second aim (and, to confess the raison d’eˆtre of this paper) is to analyze
in the constructed models a particular variety of Bell’s theorem, the so-called
Bell-CH theorem.
1I would like to thank my audience, and in particular – Leszek Wron´ski. Support by
MNiSW research grant 3165/32 is gratefully acknowledged.
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One might ask at this point, however, why yet another analysis of Bell’s
theorem? The answer is that derivations of Bell’s theorem have thus far
been either fully informal, or have left some aspect of the reasoning infor-
mal. This resistance to formal treatment stems from the multifarious nature
of Bell’s theorem: it appeals to modal aspects (e.g., “other results might
have occurred”), spatiotemporal aspects, with some rudiments of relativity
(“space-like related events should not influence one another”), and probabilis-
tic aspects (“the common past should screen off the correlations”). Thus, to
adequately analyze Bell-type theorems, a framework is needed which includes
all three features: it is modal, spatiotemporal, and probabilistic.
A brief survey of Bell-type derivations, with respect to the use of formal
methods, reveals that physicists (incl. Bell, Mermin, and Shimony) have all
done this informally. Starting with their (1999) paper, the so-called Budapest
school of Re´dei, Szabo´ and Hofer-Szabo´ has constructed rigorous models
accounting for probabilistic aspects. Belnap and Szabo´ (1996) and Kowalski
and Placek (1999) have presented models of the GHZS theorem (a non-
probabilistic Bell-type theorem)2 with modal aspects rigorously analyzed,
but the spatiotemporal aspect left informal. Mu¨ller and Placek (1999–2002)
have created models accommodating modal and probabilistic aspects of the
Bell-Aspect set-up (Aspect et al., 1982), the spatiotemporal aspect being left
informal.
In recent years, however, the branching space-times (BST), as conceived
by Belnap (1992), has been developed in a series of papers (by Belnap and
his collaborators) into a theory encompassing all the three aspects required
in analyses Bell’s theorems.3 This is an axiomatic second order theory, with
probabilities assignable to the so-called transitions of events; the theory has
a class of models (the so-called Minkowskian Branching Structures) in which
possible histories are isomorphic to the Minkowski space-time. The aim of
this paper is thus to harness the formal machinery of BST in order to analyze
the Bell-Aspect experiment, with the hope of determining, once and for all,
what the theorem’s implications actually are.
Although in the technical sections of this paper we work in the rigorous
possible-worlds framework of BST, let us begin by asking how a statistical
experiment is to be represented in a possible-worlds theory. As a preliminary
illustration intending to convey the underlying idea, consider the statistical
experiment of tossing a given coin. Let us suppose that, after a sufficiently
2See Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger (1990).
3After Belnap’s (1992) paper, the essential development of the theory is reported in
Belnap and Szabo´ (1996), Weiner and Belnap (2006), Belnap (2005), Mu¨ller (2002), Mu¨ller
(2005), Mu¨ller, Belnap and Kishida (2008), Wron´ski and Placek (2009), and Placek and
Wron´ski (2009).
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many tosses, the experimenter estimates that the probability of heads, writ-
ten as pex(H), tends to 0.6. The experimenter can take two stances in inter-
preting what pex(H) = 0.6 means.
First, she might take the experiment as deterministic, i.e., claiming that,
on each toss of the coin, there is exactly one possible outcome, either heads
or tails, and the numbers 0.6 vs. 0.4 stem from there being a few types of
runs, the particular numerical values following from the frequencies of types
of runs within the set of all runs of the experiment. Using symbol ΛH for the
set of those types of runs, whose tokens yield Heads, and wλ for the frequency
of runs of type λ in the collection of all runs of the experiment, it must be
that
(†) pex(H) =∑λ∈ΛH wλ,
and analogously for the probability of tails. At an extreme, only two types
of runs may be posited: one in which Heads are determined to occur, and
the other in which Tails are determined to occur. In this case, experimental
probabilities are identified with frequencies of corresponding types of runs.
A deterministic model of the experiment will consist of a single history, with
a chain of “toss, result” pairs, the former preceding the latter.
Second our experimenter can take an indeterministic stance while inter-
preting probability pex(H) = 0.6, acknowledging that a given run can have
more than one possible outcome (of which, of course, exactly one occurs at a
given time). Types of runs are then thought of as differentiated by propensi-
ties: if two runs belong to one type, for each possible result, the propensity
of a result on one run must agree with the propensity of that result on the
other run.4 In other words, runs of a given type are uniform with respect to
propensities. Note a peculiarity of the notion of run: it is a modally thick
notion since, to represent a run of a given type, it is not sufficient to specify
its (actual) outcome, but all the possible outcomes and propensities thereof.
In what follows, we will put forward a certain representation of this notion,
understood as modally thick.
For propensities to make contact with experimentally given probabilities,
a faithfulness assumption is needed: the number of a given (type-level) re-
sult (say, Heads) produced in runs of a given type should approximate the
propensity for the corresponding (token-level) result in a run5 of the given
type of runs. The experimental probability pex(H) is then a weighted average
4Note that we are talking type-results here, like Heads. In the formal treatment we
will have outcome tokens, and, in that context, it is more accurate to say that in two runs
propensities of outcome-tokens agree.
5Equally well we could say “in every run” as we assumed that corresponding results
attain the same propensity in every run of a given type.
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of propensities for H, as obtaining in the types of runs:
pex(H) =
∑
λ∈Λ
prλ(H)wλ, (1)
where Λ is the set of types of runs in our coin tossing experiment, prλ(H) is
the propensity for obtaining result H in any run of type λ∈Λ and wλ is the
frequency of runs of type λ in the set runs of the experiment.
On this propensity approach, our model of coin tossing must have many
histories, as it contains “forks” representing possible outcomes of tosses, and
contains all the information concerning types of runs, and propensities for
results. In short, it is like a branching structure stretching indefinitely long.
We turn now to the task of defining propensity BST models for statistical
experiments.
2 Propensity-Frequentist Models of Statisti-
cal Experiments
We are now going to explain propensity-frequentist BST models without
providing any technical details on the BST theory. The required notions are
explained in Section (4), hence, in order to fully grasp the models, the reader
is advised, after having become acquainted with the technical notions of that
section, to jump back to the present section.
For the present purpose of introducing propensity-frequentist models of
statistical experiments, it suffices to know that BST is a possible-world the-
ory, in which the role of possible worlds is played by histories. Chanciness is
represented by branching of histories, so that, for instance, an initial event
with two alternative possible outcomes is represented by two branching histo-
ries that share an initial event but contain different outcomes. Various types
of events are definable in BST of which two are relevant for our purpose
here: initial events (which are simply upper bounded subsets of histories)
and outcome events (which are more complex set-theoretical constructions).
There is a natural notion of consistency: two events are consistent iff there is
a history in which the two occur. We also say that two events are space-like
related (SLR) iff they are distinct and every element of one and every element
of the other are consistent, but none is above the other. A pair consisting of
an initial event and an outcome event above it is labeled a transition. Impor-
tantly, transitions are objects on which propensities are defined. Finally, we
assume that histories are isomorphic to Minkowski space-time; as a result,
spatiotemporal locations of events and the relation of being space-like related
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are definable. Technically, we work in the framework of the Minkowskian
Branching Structures (MBS’s), which form a class of BST models (for the
explanation, see Section (4)).
Statistical experiment idealized Let us suppose that our statistical ex-
periment consists of measuring A˜, which has possible outcomes a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜k.
Be aware that we are talking types now: in our illustration, A˜ is a toss of
a particular coin, and a˜1, a˜2 are heads up and tails up on this coin, respec-
tively. To keep clear about the types vs. tokens distinction, we use the tilde
to signify type-level notions. The statistical aspect has it that an experiment
has runs, and in each run the measurement A˜ and some one of its outcomes,
a˜i, is instantiated. What makes runs is experiment-sensitive: in the simplest
cases, instantiations of measurement A˜ is a good guide as to when a run be-
gins. In more sophisticated cases, to be considered later, we need to appeal
to some other phenomena. For simplicity, let us assume that on each run n
of the experiment a token An of A˜ and a token ani of a single a˜i occur. This
is not a stringent requirement, as one can always add “a failure outcome” to
the list of outcomes. More controversially, we assume that on each run n of
the experiment, all outcomes an1 , a
n
2 , . . . , a
n
k are in a sense possible. That is,
all these outcomes are supposed to be in a BST model and situated in such a
way that each sentence “It is possible that ani will occur” is true if evaluated
at An. On the other hand, we allow for some ani to have propensity zero.
This sounds like (and perhaps is) double talk, since, at a time, ani is possible
semantically speaking, but impossible propensity-wise. Unfortunately, we
have to engage in this to satisfy a premise of our probabilistic machinery.
The aim of our next assumption is to circumvent the problem of estimat-
ing probabilities on the basis of finitely many runs of the experiment: we
assume that the experiment has (countably) infinitely many runs. Clearly,
as the experiment may finish at this or that stage, our BST models will have
histories with a finite number of runs. Yet we take such histories to be ir-
relevant for our modeling of a statistical experiment. Thus, what we really
require is a possible history with infinitely many runs of the experiment.
We will define what it takes for the history of a BST model to adequately
represent a statistical experiment.
An objection might be raised at this point that an adequate represen-
tation of a statistical experiment, with propensities and the idealization of
infinitely many runs, should incorporate infinitely many possible histories,
representing varying distributions of the measurement outcomes. Among
these histories, there will be a majority (by the law of large numbers) of
those in which frequencies of results agree with propensities, as well as a
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minority of those in which frequencies of results do not agree with propen-
sities. Anything short of accounting for this aspect of probabilities does not
deserve the name of a“model of statistical experiments, with propensities”—
the objection continues. We agree, yet we leave this ambitious task for some
future project. Since the import of this paper is negative, as it boils down
to a claim that “a propensity-frequentist model for statistical experiment,
subject to such-and-such conditions” is not possible, a simplified represen-
tation in terms of one history is enough. That is, if a single history of a
simplified representation cannot have some desired feature, then none of the
(possibly infinitely many) histories of a full-fledged representation can posses
that feature, either.
Turning next to spatiotemporal aspects, we assume the weak gravita-
tional fields condition ensuring that Minkowski space-time is an adequate
representation of the spatiotemporal aspects of the phenomena considered.
As for spatiotemporal locations, we naturally require that every possible
outcome ani of A
n belongs to the future of possibilities of An. We next
assume the same spatiotemporal location of alternative outcomes, that is,
the following statement:
Condition 1 Suppose that outcome ani occurred in spatiotemporal region R
on run n; if on this run anj (i 6= j) occurred instead, it would occur in the
same spatiotemporal region R.
Note that the condition concerns possible outcomes of a measurement in a
fixed run. As for possible outcomes of different runs, they are assumed to
happen in different spatiotemporal regions: we assume the idealization that
there is a minimal time interval between measurements in any two consecutive
runs.
Condition 2 There is ∆∈< such that for every run l of the experiment,
if Al occurs in spatiotemporal location Ll, then Al+1 occurs in a shifted by
time  > ∆ spatiotemporal location Ll+1 = T(Ll), where for spatiotemporal
location L ⊂ <4, T(L) = {〈x0 + , x1, x2, x3〉 | 〈x0, x1, x2, x3〉 ∈L}. A se-
quence A1, A2, . . . that satisfies this condition will be called “shifted in time”
sequence.
A statistical experiment in which the above idealizing conditions are satisfied,
will here be called an idealized statistical experiment.
MBS models for idealized statistical experiments The task of speci-
fying a BST model with propensities for an idealized statistical experiment
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will be split into two parts. We first focus on the modal and spatiotemporal
aspects of the phenomena. With the idealizations assumed above, these as-
pects can be adequately captured by MBS’s. In the next part, we will add
propensities to the picture, and with propensities there will come types of
runs.
Definition 3 (MBS weakly represents) In an MBS model, history σ weakly
represents an idealized statistical experiment in which measurement event A˜
has k possible outcomes a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜k iff
1. there is in σ a sequence A1, A2, A3, . . . of shifted in time initial events,
2. for every n∈N there is k pairwise inconsistent, occurring in the same
spatiotemporal region, outcomes an1 , a
n
2 , . . . , a
n
k .
3. for every n∈N , An and the set {an1 , an2 , . . . , ank} yields the set An :=
{An → ani | 0< i6 k} of transitions.6
4. for every history h, if An occurs in h, then for some i 6 k, ani occurs
in h as well.
We say that an MBS model weakly represents the experiment in terms of
history σ and the sequnce A1,A2,A3, . . . of sets of transitions.
A central idea is that the experiment is analyzable in terms of transitions:
these are transitions from a (token-level) measurement event to its possible
outcomes (token-level as well). For simplicity, we assume here that only one
measurement (type-level) is performed in the experiment. This limitation is
removed in the definitions given in the Appendix. Observe the subtle inter-
play between the notion of run and the notion of history σ. By conditions (1)
and (4), an infinite sequence of measurements and, after each measurement,
one of its possible outcomes occur in history σ. Thus, σ codes a particu-
lar way in which the statistical experiment (idealized as infinitely long) can
go. In and of itself, history σ (as any other history) does not contain any
information as to what and where was/is/will be possible. Yet, this modal
information is coded in the model, by means of various transitions. Accord-
ingly, the notion of the run codes the measurement and its possible outcomes.
We may thus say that the notion of the run is modally thick. Note finally
that the model must have at least kω histories, i.e., uncountably many.
6In the formal treatment, these outcome events will be identified with scattered outcome
events and accordingly the transitions will be from intial events to scattered outcomes.
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MBS models with propensities for idealized statistical experiments
A BST model can be equipped with probability measures, with each proba-
bility measure µT defined on some particular set T of basic transitions. Given
that a probability measure is defined on a particular set of basic transitions,
this measure imposes probabilities on larger (i.e., not necessarily basic) tran-
sitions. The probabilities in question are naturally interpreted as propensi-
ties, i.e., degrees of possibility of the transitions in question. Yet, in order
for a BST model to have propensities for transitions, a µT probability must
be defined on an appropriate set T of basic transitions—cf. Definition (19).
In modeling an (idealized) statistical experiment we require that the relevant
propensities be defined, which in turn means that the relevant µ-probabilities
exist.
Definition 4 (MBS has propensities) An MBS modelM has propensities
for an idealized statistical experiment with measurement event A˜ and its k
possible outcomes a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜k iff M represents (modally) the experiment
in terms of some history σ, a sequence A1, A2, A3, . . . of initial events, and
the sequence A1,A2,A3, . . . of sets of transitions and propensity is defined on
every t∈ ⋃n∈N An.7
Now, even if a BST model has propensities for all the relevant transitions,
one might still be unable to relate the propensities to the experimentally es-
timated probabilities. What we need is a kind of faithfulness assumption,
which requires that the numerical values of propensities be exhibited as fre-
quencies of results in sufficiently long series of appropriate runs. Since we
assumed that the set of all runs is countably infinite, we straightforwardly
require that a numerical value of propensity for a result occurring in a run of
a given type be equal to the limiting frequency of the corresponding results
occurring in the type of runs in question.
To illustrate, consider the n-th run. The set An of transitions has some
propensity assignment, that is, for every transition t∈An, its propensity pr(t)
is defined. We first require that in history σ there is a non-empty subset Ω
of the set of all runs that are “exactly like” the n-th run. We mean by this
that a transition on the nth run and the corresponding transition on each
run from Ω have the same propensity. Second, for any i6k, the frequency in
Ω of transitions of the form Am → ami must tend to propensity pr(An → ani ).
How can it be interpreted that two sets Ai and Ak of transitions have
the same propensity assignment? Uncontroversially, propensities stem from
7It follows from the Definition (19) of propensities in terms of causal probabilities, that
pr behaves like probability. For instance, since An is an exhaustive (see clause 3) set of
alternative transitions, we have:
∑
t∈An pr(t) = 1.
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some ontological stuff, so that if a measurement process on one run and a
measurement process on another run are very much alike, the propensity
assignment on the first run should agree with the propensity assignment
on the other run. Now it is natural to reverse this story to use the same
propensity assignments to define types of runs, as follows:
Definition 5 (types of runs) Let M be an MBS with propensities that
weakly represents an idealized statistical experiment consisting in measur-
ing A˜ with k possible outcomes a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜k, in terms of history σ and the
sequence A1,A2,A3, . . . of sets of transitions.
The l-th run and the m-th run belong to the same type of runs iff for every
j 6 k: pr(Al → alj) = pr(Am → amj ).
Putting the above ideas and observations together, we arrive at this de-
finition of an MBS representing fully, i.e., modally, spatiotemporally, and
probabilistically, an idealized statistical experiment:
Definition 6 (MBS model fully represents) Let M be an MBS model
with propensities for an idealized statistical experiment consisting of mea-
surement A˜, its k possible outcomes a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜k, and their experimental
probabilities pex(a˜1), . . . , p
ex(a˜k). Let the experiment be weakly represented in
M in terms of history σ and the sequence A1,A2,A3, . . . of sets of transi-
tions. We say that M fully represents the experiment in terms of propensity
assignment pr, history σ and the set A1,A2,A3, . . . iff there is a partition Λ
of the set N of natural numbers such that
1. for every l,m∈N : l,m∈λ for some λ∈Λ iff for every j 6 k:
pr(Al → alj) = pr(Am → amj ),
2. pex(a˜i) =
∑
λwλpr(A
Θ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ), where Θ : Λ → N is a “selection
function” such that Θ(λ)∈λ, and
wλ = limn→∞
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ}
n
,
3. for every λ∈Λ and i6 k:
pr(AΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ) = lim
n→∞
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ ∧ σ ∈H〈ami 〉}
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ} ,
where H〈ami 〉 is the set of histories in which a
m
i occurs.
To explain, the model has a history with an infinite sequence of initial events,
representing (token-level) measurement events. Thus, by partitioning the set
of natural numbers, we partition the set of initial events, each element of the
partition being intuitively thought of as a type of runs.8 Clause 1 ensures
8Note that Λ is at most countably infinite.
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that Λ is the set of types of runs in the sense of Definition (5). Clause 2 is an
Empirical Adequacy condition, as it draws a bridge between experimentally
estimated probabilities and propensities (via weights). A value of the weight
of a given type is equated to the limiting frequency of runs of this type in
history σ. Observe that a type whose tokens appear only finitely many times
in σ receives weight zero. The last clause postulates that history σ exhibits
propensities of transitions in terms of limiting frequencies of corresponding
outcomes, as occurring in runs of appropriate types.
Why might one want to postulate types of runs and propensities, which
are unobserved and controversial entities, to account for a statistical experi-
ment? The aim that comes to the fore in the context of quantum non-locality
is to explain correlations between spatially distant results. Having seen that
explaining such correlations in terms of a deterministic model is not viable,
one may turn to models with propensities, as there seems to be more free-
dom in propensities than in strict determinism. The crucial task is then to
derive correlated experimental probabilities from some “more basic” proba-
bilities without correlations and from a distribution of types of runs in the
experiment.
Leaving aside the task of constructing deterministic BST models for Bell-
type phenomena, as they have been discussed elsewhere, we focus here on
indeterministic models with propensities. We will first analyze a simplified
EPR set-up, to finally turn to Bell’s theorem, deriving the so called Bell-
Clauser-Horne inequality (in short, Bell-CH), cf. Clauser and Horne (1974).9
3 Simple EPR Explained Away
A peculiar feature of Bell-type experiments is that chanciness (or its appear-
ance) occurs at two levels: on each measurement device, there is a selection
of a measurement setting (e.g., direction of polarization), and each measure-
ment has more than one possible outcome. As a warm-up, we will focus first
on a simplified experiment, however, in which no selection of measurement
settings occur. This is, in essence, as set-up with fixed polarizations, for
which there is a hidden variable model—see Bell (1987); here we will call
this “simple EPR.” The description of the setup is as follows: there are two
space-like related measurement events A˜ and B˜ (type-level), with alternative
possible results (type-level) a˜1, a˜2, . . . , a˜I of A˜ and b˜1, b˜2, . . . , b˜J of B˜. Every
9An important step towards this formula was the argument of Clauser, Holt, Shimony,
and Horne (1969).
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combination a˜i, b˜j is possible. Results are correlated, i.e.,
pex(a˜i) · pex(b˜j) 6= pex(a˜i and b˜j).
We will hereby construct an MBS, in which some history fully represents
this experiment. Yet, as we are troubled by the (experimentally observed)
correlations above, we attempt the following explanation: the runs of this ex-
periment are not uniform as perhaps the state of the source of particles vary,
or the measurement process might not exactly be alike on every run. Yet, one
may consider a division of the set of runs into types of exactly alike runs. Our
article of faith, motivated solely by our uneasiness with distant correlations,
is that in each set of exactly alike runs there are no distant correlations, i.e.,
probabilities factor. In the language of the Bell literature, we envisage some
“hidden variable” parametrizing hidden states of pairs of particles involved
in the experiment—“hidden” as it is not accounted by quantum mechanics.
The hidden variable can take on a number of values, and each joint probabil-
ity mentioned above, if conditioned on each value of the variable, factors into
single probabilities (conditional on the value). Now, on the assumption of
indeterminism, a measurement in a given run has many possible outcomes,
and the idea of propensity comes up naturally.Furthermore, drawing on an
argument sketched in the last section, if some runs are exactly alike, the
propensity of corresponding transitions in these runs should be the same.
By this train of reasoning, we end up with the task of constructing an MBS,
which yields experimentally observed distant correlations (the results of the
existence of many types of runs) with such values of propensities that in each
run the distant results are uncorrelated. In other words, a crucial part of the
task is to show that it is it possible to recover experimentally estimated prob-
abilities, including the correlations above, on the assumption that for every
type λ of runs there is no correlation, i.e., for every i6 I and every j 6 J we
have, schematically,
pr(aλi ) · pr(bλj ) = pr(aλi and bλj )? (2)
0ur MBS M should fulfill these desiderata:
Desiderata (†)
1. There is in M a history σ containing a sequence A1∪B1, A2∪B2, A3∪
B3, . . . of temporally shifted initial events and for every n∈N : An and
Bn are SLR;
2. for every n∈N , there is I ∈N pairwise inconsistent, occurring in the
same spatiotemporal region, (scattered) outcomes an1 , a
n
2 , . . . , a
n
I such
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that An is below each ani (i 6 I),10 and each such outcome is SLR to
Bn;
3. for every n∈N , there is J ∈N pairwise inconsistent, occurring in the
same spatiotemporal region, (scattered) outcomes bn1 ,b
n
2 , . . . ,b
n
J such
that Bn is below each bnj (i6J), and each such outcome is SLR to An;
4. if An ∪Bn occurs in history h, then for some i6 I, j 6 J , both ani and
bnj occur in h;
5. ai and bj are consistent, for every i6 I and j 6 J ;
6. for any history h and any n, An occurs in h iff Bn occurs in h, i.e.,
H[An] = H[Bn].
From conditions (1), (2) and (3) it immediately follows that for every n∈N ,
there are two sets of transitions, induced by An and Bn, respectively, namely
An := {An → anI | 0 < i 6 I} and Bn := {Bn → bnj | 0 < j 6 J}. With
clause (4) added, they also imply that for every n∈N there is a third set
Cn := {An ∪ Bn → ani ∪ bnj | 0 < i 6 I and 0 < j 6 J} of transitions from
initials to (scattered) outcomes–see Fact (23).
Having accepted the “enumerating” convention: (A∪B)n := An∪Bn and
(ani ∪ bj)n := ani ∪ bnj , it is immediate to see that an MBS M which fulfills
the above desiderata weakly represents our statistical experiments in terms
of history σ and the sequence C1,C2,C3, . . . of sets of transitions.
Observe that, in the terminology developed in Section (5), the stipula-
tions above amount to saying that for every n∈N , An and Bn is a set of
exclusive alternative transitions of the same spatiotemporal location, and
each such pair induces a third set Cn of alternative transitions of the same
spatiotemporal location. Further, given that An and Bn occur in exactly the
same histories, the transitions of the last set are also exclusive—cf. facts of
section (5).
We next need to equip our model with propensities, defined for every rel-
evant transition, that is, for every transition from An, Bn and Cn, for every
n∈N . Given the facts of section (5), it suffices to postulate that some partic-
ular causally significant sets, called sets of past causal loci (pcl), are eligible
for producing a causal probability space. We require that the numerical val-
ues of these propensities recover experimentally estimated probabilities and
that with respect to these propensities, every transition from An be proba-
bilistically independent from every transition from Bn.
10In the sense of An <∀∃ ani .
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The existence of a model fully representing the experiment requires a set
Λ of types of runs, with each λ∈Λ having associated weight wλ. Empirical
Adequacy (clause 3 of Definition (6)) then dictates:
pex(a˜i and b˜j) =
∑
λ∈Λ
wλ · pr(AΘ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ∪ bΘ(λ)j ) (3)
for every n∈N , λ∈Λ, i 6 I, and j 6 J , where Θ : Λ → N is such that
Θ(λ)∈λ.
What is, however, a proper formulation of the condition that with respect
to propensities, every transition from An be probabilistically independent
from every transition from Bn? It turns out that, thanks to desiderata (2),
(3), (5) and (6) imposed on our MBS, the assumptions of Definition (32) of a
special case of probabilistic independence are satisfied, and this independence
condition amounts to the satisfaction of these equations:
pr(AΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i )pr(BΘ(λ) → bΘ(λ)j ) = pr(AΘ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ∪ bΘ(λ)j ).
(4)
Above Θ is a “selection function”— for every type of runs it chooses a rep-
resentative run of this type. Formally, Θ : Λ→ N and Θ(λ)∈λ.
Moreover, An and Bn satisfy the assumptions of Fact 29, which in turn
allows us to rewrite the above set of equations as follows:
(
∑
l 6 J
pr(AΘ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ∪ bΘ(λ)l ))(
∑
m6 I
pr(AΘ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) →
aΘ(λ)m ∪ bΘ(λ)j )) = pr(AΘ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ∪ bΘ(λ)j ),
(5)
We will now argue that there is a BST model with finitely many types
of runs and propensities that fully represents the statistical experiment de-
scribed, and in this model space-like related transitions are independent
propensity-wise. That is, there is a finite partition Λ of N such that for
every λ∈Λ, its weight wλ is non-zero and the propensity assignment satisfies
Equations (3) and (5). Our task is to find weights wλ and propensities pr for
any set of experimental probabilities pex that can arise in this experiment.
To introduce a shorter notation, let us put:
qij := p
ex(a˜i and b˜j) pijλ := pr(A
Θ(λ) ∪BΘ(λ) → aΘ(λ)i ∪ bΘ(λ)j ) · wλ
Then we rewrite the above two sets (3) and (5) of equations as:
qij =
∑
λ∈Λ
pijλ and (
∑
j 6 J
pkjλ) · (
∑
i6 I
pimλ) = wλpkmλ. (6)
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We assume that qij’s are given and solve for pijλ’s and wλ’s.
We will argue that there are always quasi-deterministic solutions of Equa-
tions (6), in the sense that every probability pr(An∪Bn → ani ∪bnj ) is either
zero or one. To see that this is indeed the case, we assume that every prob-
ability of the form above is either zero or one, and then define partition Λ of
natural numbers into at most I × J subsets λij (i6 I, j 6 J) such that:11
λij := {n∈N | pr(An ∪Bn → ani ∪ bnj ) = 1.}
Then we may easily check that we have these solutions for Eqs. 6:
pijλ = qij if λ = λij and 0 otherwise (7)
ωλ = qij if λ = λij and 0 otherwise . (8)
Observe that with these solutions, types of runs work deterministically: if
we are in nth run and the run is of type λij, the propensity for the transition
(An ∪ Bn → ani ∪ bnj ) is one, and the propensity for a transition to any
other outcome of An ∪ Bn is zero. In the hidden-variable language, this is a
determinate-value (or deterministic) hidden variable model.
We have just proved that there is propensity assignment that fulfills clause
(3) of our Definition (6) of what it means that a BST model fully represents
a statistical experiment. As for the remaining clauses, it is rather straight-
forward to construct an MBS model that satisfies the desiderata (†)—they
guarantee that the model modally and spatiotemporally represents the sta-
tistical experiment. We need further ensure that each transition of the form
Anai or Bnbj involves only finitely many finitely splitting points—this
will guarantee that the transition is eligible for propensity assignment—see
Section (4). As postulated above, the model has at most I×J types of runs.
We need to take care that these types be distributed in history σ, in accor-
dance with clause 2 of Definition (6). This is simple if every ωλ is rational
(which in turn depends on whether every pex(a˜i and b˜j) is rational) and it is
only a little more complex if the above numbers are irrational. Finally, to
satisfy clause 4 of the Definition, one may require that in a run of type λij
outcomes ai and bj occur in history σ. For scarcity of space, we leave the
explicit construction of the model to the reader. For the same reason, we do
not enter here into a more exciting topic, namely whether it is possible to
construct a full fledged indeterministic model with uncorrelated propensities
for the experiment, where “full fledged” means that all (or, most) relevant
transitions have neither propensity zero nor propensity one.
11The partition has less than I × J elements if qij = 0 for some i6 I, j 6 J .
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4 BST, MBS, and Causal Probability Spaces
The aim of Belnap’s (1992) theory of branching space-times (BST) is to
combine objective indeterminism and relativity. A BST model is a non-
empty partially ordered set W subject to some postulates (listed below). W
is called ‘Our World’ and interpreted as the set of all possible point events.
A partial ordering 6 on W is interpreted as a pre-causal order between point
events.12 Typically Our World W has many possible scenarios, this last idea
being rendered by a technical notion of history:
Definition 7 A set h⊆W is upward-directed iff ∀e1, e2 ∈h ∃e∈h such that
e1 6 e and e2 6 e.
A set h is maximal with respect to the above property iff ∀g ∈W such that
h ( g, g is not upward-directed.
A subset h of W is a history iff it is a maximal upward-directed set.
For histories h1 and h2, any maximal element in h1 ∩ h2 is called a choice
event for h1 and h2.
A BST model is then defined as follows (for more information about BST,
see Belnap (1992)):
Definition 8 〈W,6〉, where W is a nonempty set and 6 is a partial ordering
on W , is a model of BST if and only if it meets the following requirements:
1. The ordering 6 is dense.
2. W has no maximal elements with respect to 6 .
3. Every lower bounded chain in W has an infimum in W .
4. Every upper bounded chain in W has a supremum in every history that
contains it.
5. For any lower bounded chain O⊆h1/h2 there exists an event e∈W
such that e is maximal in h1 ∩h2 and ∀e′ ∈O : e< e′ (this is the Prior
Choice Principle, abbreviated as PCP).
A consequence of PCP is that every two histories overlap and have at least one
choice point. The postulates also imply that the relation ≡e of undividedness
of histories at event e, (defined by h ≡e h′ iff ∃e′ : e < e′ ∧ e′ ∈h ∩ h′) is an
equivalence relation on the set H(e) := {h∈Hist | e∈h}. Thus, ≡e induces
a partition Πe of the set H(e); we write Πe〈h〉 (where h∈H(e)) for a unique
12We read ‘e1 6 e2’ as ‘e2 is in a possible future of e1,’ or as ‘e1 can causally influence
e2.’
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element of partition Πe to which h belongs. And we say that event e is
finitely splitting if card(Πe) is larger than one but finite. For I a subset of
a history, one may define undividedness in I: h ≡I h′ iff h ≡e h′ for every
e∈ I. This is an equivalence relation on the set H[I] := {h∈Hist | I ⊆h},
so it induces a partition of it, written as ΠI .
BST allows one to define a few concepts of events (apart from point
events) and relations between them. For our purposes, the most important
are initial events and scattered outcome events, and the relation of being
space-like related.
Definition 9 (types of events and SLR) An initial event is an upper bounded
subset of a history; an outcome chain event is a lower bounded non-empty
chain in W ; a scattered outcome event is a set of outcome chain events all
of which overlap some one history.
Two point events are space-like related (SLR) if they are distinct, share a
history, and are incomparable by the pre-causal ordering; A⊆h1 and B⊆h2
are SLR iff every element of A and every element of B are SLR; Initial event
A and scattered outcome O = {Oδ}δ ∈∆ are SLR iff A and Oδ are SLR, for
every δ ∈∆.
An important class of structures, as they play causal and probabilistic
roles, are transitions. A transition is a pair consisting of an initial event and
an outcome event located properly above it. We will only use two kinds of
transitions:
Definition 10 (transitions) A transition from initial event to scattered
outcome event is a pair 〈I,O〉, where I and O are, resp., an initial event
and a scattered outcome event such that I <∀∃ O, where the last condition
means that ∀e∈ I ∃O∈O∀x∈O (e < x).
A basic transition is a pair 〈e,H〉, where e is a choice event and H ∈Πe.
We will denote transitions by I  O and e H, resp.
A way of looking at EPR phenomena is that a combinatorially allowable
history, say one with spin + on the left and spin + on the right, is not
possible. A BST property used to analyze this phenomenon is called Modal
Funny Business (MFB) and defined as follows:
Definition 11 (MFB) Two initial events A and B, and two histories hA, hB
such that A⊆hA and B⊆hB constitute a case of modal funny business
(MFB) iff (1) A SLR B and (2) ΠA〈hA〉 ∩ ΠB〈hB〉 = ∅.
In what follows, we will always assume No Modal Funny Business.
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We need a few “propositional” notions, especially the so-called occurrence
propositions, defined in terms of sets of histories. We say that an event occurs
in history h iff h belongs to the occurrence proposition for this event.
Definition 12 (propositions) The occurrence proposition for point event
e is the set H(e) := {h∈Hist | e∈h}; the occurrence proposition for initial
event I is the set H[I] := {h∈ Hist | I ⊆h}; the occurrence proposition
for outcome chain event O is the set H〈O〉 := {h∈Hist | O ∩ h 6= ∅};
the occurrence proposition for scattered outcome event O is the set H〈O〉 :=⋂
O∈OH〈O〉.
Occurrence propositions permit one to define generally the notion of con-
sistency. Two objects, X and Y are consistent if their occurrence propositions
intersect non-emptily.
We turn next to causal notions. A novelty of Belnap’s (2005) analysis is
that he asks for causes of transitions. Given indeterminism, the best one can
get as a causal analysis of transition I  O is the notion of a factor that
keeps O possible rather than prohibit its occurrence. The events relevant
to this process are choice events at which some history in which I occurs
branches from every history in which O occurs. These events are called
causal loci of a transition; some particular basic transitions, whose initials
are past causal loci, are called originating causes, or causae causantes of a
transition considered. Belnap proves that they satisfy a version of Mackie’s
INUS condition. The definitions are as follows:
Definition 13 (pcl and cc) Let I  O be a transition from initial event
to scattered event.
Event e belongs to the set cl(I  O) of cause-like loci of the transition iff
∃h∈H[I] h ⊥e H〈O〉.
Event e belongs to the set pcl(I  O) of past causal loci of the transition iff
e∈ cl(I  O) and ∃O∈O∀x∈O e < x.
Basic transition t = e H belongs to the set cc(I  O) of causae causantes
of the transition iff e∈ pcl(I  O) and H = Πe〈h〉 for some history h∈H〈O〉.
An important theorem, proved by Belnap (2002), says that if there is no
MFB, then every element of the set of cause-like loci of a transition to a
scattered outcome is in the past of some element of the scattered outcome.
We put this theorem in the following form:
Theorem 14 (NB’s theorem) If there is no MFB in a BST model, then
for any transition I  O to scattered outcome, cl(I  O) <∀∃ O.
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In our modeling of statistical experiments, we assume that the underlying
space-times are Minkowski’s. Thus, we need a class of BST models, in which
histories are isomorphic to the Minkowski space-time. These are the so-called
Minkowskian Branching Structures (MBS’s).13
For our present purposes, it suffices to say that in an MBS point events
have spatiotemporal locations; we write s(e) for spatiotemporal location of
point event e (for brevity, in what follows we abbreviate this term to “st-
location” ). In a natural way, we can use st-locations of point events to define
the concept st-location for initial events, outcome chain events, scattered
outcomes, etc.
4.1 Causal Probability Spaces
A (classical) probability space is a triple 〈A,F, µ〉, where A is a non-empty
set called a sample space, FE is a Boolean σ-algebra of subsets of A (called
event algebra), and µ is a normalized to unity, countably additive measure on
F . For Mu¨ller’s (2005) concept of causal probability space (the generalized
version), consider a finite set E of finitely splitting points such that minimal
elements of E are consistent (since E is finite, its every element is above
some minimal element of E). The elements of a causal probability space
〈AE, FE, µE〉 associated with set E are constructed as follows:
1. Consider the complete set of alternative basic transitions that have
initials in E, i.e., set T˜E = {t∈T r | i(t)∈E)}, where T r is the set of
basic transitions and i(t) is the initial of transition t.
2. Identify the sample space AE with the set of all maximally consistent
subsets of T˜E,
3. Since the case is finite, take for event algebra FE the set-theoretical
algebra of subsets of AE,
4. Define a normalized to unity measure µE on FE.
To explain clause 2 above, two basic transitions e1  H1 and e2  H2 are
consistent iff H1 ∩ H2 6= ∅. As was mentioned before, there are finististic
assumptions concerning the construction of causal probability spaces. For
the record, we capture them here in this definition:
Definition 15 (eligible for producing a causal probability space) E ⊂
W is eligible for producing a causal probability space if E is a finite set of
finitely splitting points and the minimal elements of E are consistent.
13They were introduced by Placek (2000a), then rigorously defined for finitary cases by
(Mu¨ller, 2002), and defined generally by Wron´ski and Placek (2009).
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Many causal probability spaces may “live” in a given BST model, and a
set of basic transitions may belong to many event algebras, each associated
with a different subset E of W . Thus, a question arises of how to represent
an element of a “smaller” probability space in a “larger” probability space
so that one could subsequently postulate that an element of the smaller
probability space and its representative in the larger probability space are
ascribed the same value by the two probability measures. That is, let E and
E ′ be sets of splitting points eligible for producing causal probability spaces,
with T˜E and T˜E′ their complete sets of alternative basic transitions, resp.,
and such that T˜E ⊆ T˜E′ .
Mu¨ller defines representability only if E⊆E ′ and requires that the larger
set T˜E′ differs from the smaller set T˜E only by transitions located above
those of T˜ , i.e., if e′ ∈E ′/E, then ∀e : e∈E → e < e′. Since we cannot
fulfill this last postulate, we need to generalize the concept. We first state
when one event algebra represents some other event algebra. Next, we define
an auxiliary notion of rep of an element of one sample space in an event
algebra. With the help of this notion we finally state what a representative
of an element of one event algebra in some other event algebra is.
Definition 16 (representability) Let E⊆W and E ′⊆W be sets of split-
ting points, each eligible for the construction of a causal probability space.
FE is said to be representable in FE′ iff E⊆E ′, and if e′ ∈E ′/E, then
( ∀e∈E : e < e′ or e′ SLR E).
For a∈AE, the rep rE′(a) of a in FE′ is: rE′(a) := {a′ ∈AE′ | a⊆ a′}.
For x∈FE, the representative RE′(x) of x in FE′ is:
RE′(x) :=
⋃
{z ∈FE′ | ∃a∈AE a∈x ∧ z = rE′(a)}.
Having the notion of representative, we may state the Marginal Property,
which we assume in the rest of this paper. Marginal Property requires that
an element of one event algebra and its representative in some other event
algebra are assigned the same numerical value by the probability measures
defined on the two event algebras:
Definition 17 (marginal property) Let 〈AE, FE, µE〉 and 〈AE′ , FE′ , µE′〉
be causal probability spaces with FE being representable in FE′. Then if
x′ ∈FE′ is the representative of x∈FE,
µE′(x
′) = µE(x).
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Recall that an element of the sample space of a causal probability space
is a maximal consistent set of basic transitions. One might have a forebod-
ing that basic transitions should be independent. With this intuition it is
tempting to postulate that the probability of an atom be the product of
probabilities of its elements — basic transitions. As Nature can go her own
unaccountable ways, we had better not assume this postulate, but merely
single out those causal probability spaces that satisfy this condition.
Definition 18 (uncorrelated probability space) Let 〈AE, FE, µE〉 be a
causal probability space. We say that it is uncorrelated if for every a∈AE:
µE(A) =
∏
x∈ a
µ{i(x)}(x),
where i(x) is the initial event of basic transition x.
Note thats a causal probability space is produced out of a set of basic
transitions, subject to some requirements. Can we use it to assign proba-
bilities to other BST structures, in particular to (non-basic) transitions? It
seems utterly reasonable that if probability is defined for a certain transition,
it should be derivable from probabilities of its causae causantes. This is a
desideratum of the ‘nothing but causae causantes’ that Weiner and Belnap
(2006) assumed (their Postulate 4-4):
When pr(I  ai) is defined, nothing counts except nature-given sto-
chastic features of its causae causantes—including the possibility that
one may need to take into account not only probabilities of individual
causae causantes, but also probabilities of certain sets of them, taken
as operating jointly. [. . . ]
In line with the tradition, we will call single-case objective probabilities
of transitions propensities, and write them as pr(). Allowing that causae
causantes may work together, the desideratum above boils down to this def-
inition of propensities:
Definition 19 (propensities) A propensity of transition I  O, if de-
fined, is the following:
pr(I  O) = µpcl((IO)(I  O).
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5 Facts About Structures Occurring in EPR-
Like Experiments
The purpose of this section is to justify our (seemingly loose) talk of propen-
sities by relating it to hard facts about the so-called causal probability spaces
of BST. The justification relies on showing that structures occurring in our
BST models allow for defining causal probability spaces, exactly of the sort
that assign propensities to the transitions considered. In our analysis of sta-
tistical experiments, we have typically considered finitely many transitions
from one initial event to scattered outcome events, where the scattered out-
come events are pairwise inconsistent. A set of such transitions represents a
measurement event with its alternative possible outcome events (both kinds
of events are token-level). We define:
Definition 20 (exclusive alternative transitions) Let Tr = {I  ai |
i6 I} be a set of transition from initial event I to scattered outcome events
ai. We say that Tr is a set of exclusive alternative transitions of the same
st-location iff
1. H〈ai〉 ∩H〈aj〉 = ∅ if i 6= j; alternative outcomes
2. ∀h∃j : h∈H[I] → h∈H〈aj〉, exclusiveness
3. all ai’s have the same st-location. same st-location
For each transition A ai, its set pcl(A ai) =: pcli is consistent. We
will always additionally assume that each pcli is finite and its every element
is finitely splitting. We aim to build a causal probability space associated
with E :=
⋃
i6 I pcli, but for this to be viable, the minimal elements of E
should be consistent. The fact below testifies that indeed this is the case.
Fact 21 Let Tr = {I  ai | i6I} be a set of exclusive alternative transitions
of the same st-location such that each pcli := pcl(I  ai) is finite and its
elements finitely splitting. Then minimal elements in pcl :=
⋃
i6 I pcli are
consistent.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that the set of minimal elements of pcl is
not consistent. Then for every h∈H[I] there is a minimal element e∈ pcl
such that e 6∈h. Accordingly, one may take an arbitrary h∈H[I] and some
i 6 I such that e∈ pcl(I  ai) but e 6∈h and e is minimal in pcl. Pick
now some h′ ∈H〈ai〉; clearly e∈h′. By applying PCP to e, h, and h′, we
have ∃e′ : e′ < e ∧ h ⊥e′ h′, from which h ⊥e′ H〈ai〉 follows. Accordingly,
21
e′ ∈ pcl(I  ai). Hence e′<e contradicts the assumption that e is a minimal
element of pcl. 
We will now argue that for a set Tr = {I  ai | i 6 I} of exclusive
alternative transitions of the same st-location, such that pcl :=
⋃
i6 I pcl(I 
ai) is eligible for producing a causal probability space, the sample space Apcl
is exactly the set of all sets of causae causantes of transitions from Tr.
Fact 22 Let Tr = {I  ai | i 6 I} be a set of exclusive alternative tran-
sitions of the same st-location such that pcl :=
⋃
i6 I pcl(I  ai) is eligible
for producing a causal probability space. Then the sample space Apcl of the
probability space 〈Apcl, Fpcl, µpcl〉 is: Apcl = {cc(I  ai) | i6 I}.
Proof: To the left first. Supppose for reductio that a certain cc(I  ai)
is not a member of Apcl, which means that it is not a maximally consis-
tent subset of T˜pcl (recall that every set of causae causantes is consistent).
Accordingly, there is t∈ T˜pcl, t = e  H, such that t 6∈ cc(I  ai) and
cc(I  ai) ∪ {t} is consistent (?). If e∈ pcl(I  ai), then either t be-
longed or was inconsistent with the set cc(I  ai). It thus must be that
e∈ pcl(I  aj) for some j 6= i, j 6 I. Accordingly, e <∃ aj. But it cannot
be that (†) e <∃ ai: if (†) were true, H〈ai〉⊆H∗ for the same H∗ ∈Πe, and,
accordingly, e∈ pcl(A ai). Since ai and aj have the same spatiotemporal
st-location, for ¬(e <∃ ai) to obtain, e and ai must be inconsistent, from
which it follows that t and cc(I  ai) are inconsistent. Contradiction with
(?).
In the opposite direction, Apcl is the set of maximally consistent subsets
of T˜ = {t∈B | i(t)∈ pcl)}, where B is the set of basic transitions and i(t)
is the initial event of basic transition t. Clearly, every cc(I  ai) is a
maximally consistent subset of T˜ . It remains to be seen that there is no
maximal consistent subset of T˜ that is not cc(I  ai) for some i6 I. By the
condition of exclusiveness, every element of T˜ belongs to some cc(I  ai) for
i 6 I. It remains to be seen that no element of Apcl can have two elements,
t1 : e1  H1 and t2 := e2  H2 such that, for some i 6= j 6 I:
t1 ∈ cc(I  ai) but t1 6∈ cc(I  aj) and t2 6∈ cc(I  ai) but t2 ∈ cc(I  aj).
It cannot be that e1 ∈ pcl(I  aj); otherwise t1 ∈ cc(I  aj) or t1 is incon-
sistent with t2. Similarly, e2 6∈ pcl(I  ai). Clearly, e1 <∃ ai. Yet, ai and
aj are in the same st-location. But it cannot be that e1 <∃ aj, since then e1
would belong to pcl(I  aj). It must thus be that e1 and H〈aj〉 are inconsis-
tent, and hence, (since e1 <∃ ai) H〈ai〉 ∩H〈aj〉 = ∅. Hence, t1 is inconsistent
with t2, which means that the two cannot belong to any one element of Apcl.
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
To represent a joint experiment in which two measurements occur in
separate “stations,” we need two sets of exclusive alternative transitions of
the same st-location. Each set represents a measurement in one station. It
is a welcome consequence that such two sets induce a third set of exclusive
alternative transitions of the same st-location, naturally representing the
joint measurement and its possible joint outcomes:
Fact 23 Let Tra := {A ai | i 6 I} and Trb := {B  bj | i 6 J} be sets
of exclusive alternative transitions of the same st-location such that ai∪bj is
a scattered outcome for every i6 I, j 6 J . Then Trab := {A ∪B ai ∪ bj |
i6I, j6J} is a set of exclusive alternative transitions of the same st-location.
Proof: Immediate. 
The induced set has an interesting property: the sets of past causal loci
of, resp., Tra, Trb and the induced set TRab, are nicely related:
Fact 24 For initial events A,B, scattered outcomes a,b, and a∪b such that
A <∀∃ a, B <∀∃ b:
pcl(A ∪B a ∪ b)⊆ pcl(A a) ∪ pcl(B b).
Proof. From the order relations assumed in the premises, A∪B <∀∃ a∪b.
Let e∈ pcl(A ∪ B  a ∪ b). Then for some h∈HA∪B: h ⊥e H〈a∪b〉 and
e <∃ a ∪ b, and hence e <∃ a or e <∃ b. Suppose the former (the other case
is symmetric). Clearly, h∈H[A]. Pick now an arbitrary h′ ∈H〈a∪b〉; it follows
that h′ ∈H〈a〉 and h ⊥e h′, so h ⊥e Πe〈h′〉. Since e <∃ a and h′ ∈ H〈a〉,
it follows that H〈a〉 ⊆ Πe〈h′〉. Accordingly, h ⊥e H〈a〉, which proves that
e∈ pcl(A a).

Fact 25 Let A  a and A ∪ B  a ∪ a be transitions from initials to
scattered outcomes. Let H[A]⊆H[B]. Then pcl(A a)⊆ pcl(A∪B a∪b).
Proof: Let e∈ pcl(A  a). Then for some h∈H[A]: h ⊥e H〈a〉. By the
premise (H[A]⊆H[B]), h∈H[A∪B]. Since H〈a∪b〉⊆H〈a〉, it follows that h ⊥e
H〈a∪b〉. Thus e∈ pcl(A ∪B a ∪ b).

Combining Facts (24) and (25) above, we arrive at the following:
Fact 26 For initial events A,B, scattered outcomes a,b, and a∪b such that
A <∀∃ a, B <∀∃ b, and H[A] = H[B]:
pcl(A ∪B a ∪ b) = pcl(A a) ∪ pcl(B b).
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This fact has a consequence for sets of causaes causantes:
Fact 27 For initial events A,B, scattered outcomes a,b, and a∪b such that
A <∀∃ a, B <∀∃ b, and H[A] = H[B]:
cc(A ∪B a ∪ b) = cc(A a) ∪ cc(B b).
As a hint for the proof, note that if e <∃ a∪b, then Πe〈a∪b〉 is identical to
Πe〈a〉 or to Πe〈b〉, or to both, depending on whether e <∃ a, or e <∃ b, or
both. In the opposite direction, if e <∃ a, then Πe〈a〉 is identical to Πe〈a∪b〉,
as a ∪ b is a scattered outcome by assumption.
Suppose now that we have three sets of exclusive alternative transitions:
Tra := {A ai | i 6 I}, Trb := {B  bj | i 6 J} and Trab := {A ∪ B 
ai ∪ bj | i 6 I, j 6 J} (the induced set). Suppose further that their past
causal loci yield causal probability spaces, associated respectively with E1 :=⋃
i6I pcl(A ai), E2 :=
⋃
j6J pcl(B  bj), and E :=
⋃
i6I,j6J pcl(A ∪ B 
ai ∪bj). We would like to represent elements of the event algebra associated
with Ei i∈{1, 2} in the event algebra associated with E. But is E eligible
for producing a causal probability space, if each Ei is eligible for producing a
causal probability space? And are the conditions of representability satisfied?
Under a rather special condition of H[A] = H[B], this is the case indeed.
We need to prove that (1) Ei⊆E and (2) e∈E/Ei → (e >∀ Ei ∨
e SLR Ei), (3) the minimal elements of E are consistent if minimal ele-
ments of Ei are consistent, and (4) E is finite and its elements are finitely
splitting, if Ei is finite and its elements are finitely splitting.
Given that H[A] = H[B], (1) is a consequence of Fact (25). (4) follows
from Fact (24). For (3), suppose that the set of minimal elements of E1 is
a subset of history h; then A⊆h. By H[A] = H[B] we have B⊆h. By the
exclusiveness condition on Trb, every minimal element of E2 must be in h.
Finally, (2) is proved in this Fact:
Fact 28 Suppose that there are three sets of exclusive alternative transitions:
Tra := {A  ai | i 6 I}, Trb := {B  bj | i 6 J} and (the induced set)
Trab := {A ∪ B  ai ∪ bj | i 6 I, j 6 J} such that H[A] = H[B]. Then: if
e∈ ⋃i6 I,j 6 J pcl(A ∪ B  ai ∪ bj) := E, but e 6∈ ⋃i6 I pcl(A ai) = E1,
then e >∀ E1 ∨ e SLR E1.
Proof: Given Fact 26, the premises imply that e∈ pcl(B  bj for some
j 6 J , but († )∀i 6 I : e 6∈ pcl(A  ai). For reductio, let e < e′ for some
e′ ∈E1. It follows that e′ ∈ pcl(A ak) for some k6 I. Since e < e′, it must
be that e∈ pcl(A ak). Contradiction with (†). 
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Representatives. To investigate representability in these settings, let us
assume that Tra := {A ai | i6I} and Trb := {B bj | i6J} are sets of
exclusive alternative transitions of the same st-location, such thatH[A] = H[B]
and that the two sets induce Trab = {A ∪ B  ai ∪ bj | i 6 I, j 6 J},
yet another set of exclusive alternative transitions of the same st-location.
Consider now four sets of splitting points, with which we wish to associate
causal probability spaces:
C := pcl(A ai) for a fixed i6 I
D :=
⋃
i6 I pcl(A ai),
E :=
⋃
i6 I,j 6 J pcl(A ∪B ai ∪ bj)
G := pcl(A ∪B ai ∪ bj) for fixed i6 I, j 6 J .
As explained in Definition (19), propensity of A  ai is determined by
measure µC , taken on the set of causae causantes of the transition, that is:
14
pr(A ai) = µC(cc(A ai)).
Given that pcl(A  ai) is eligible for producing a causal probability space
(for every i6I), does D the same property? Clearly, C ⊆D and D is a finite
set of finitely splitting points, if each pcl(A  ai) is. So D has minimal
elements. Moreover, the minimal elements are consistent—cf. Fact (19). Is
then the event algebra FC representable in FD? Obviously, C ⊆D and if
e∈D/C, then e >∀ C; otherwise for some e′: e < e′ and e′ ∈ pcl(A ak)),
where i 6= k, which entails e∈ pcl(A ak)). Contradiction with e∈D/C.
Finally, by Fact (22), cc(A ai)∈AC , i.e., the singleton of cc(A ai)
is an atom in event algebra associated with C. This singleton is also an
atom in event algebra associated to D, i.e., cc(A  ai)∈AD. For by the
condition of alternative outcomes, adding to cc(A  ai) a transition from
cc(A ak)/cc(A ai) (where k 6= i) would destroy consistency. Thus,
µD(cc(A ai)) = µC(cc(A ai)) = pr(A ai).
Let us next turn to representability of events from FD in the event algebra
FE. By Fact (26), and the usual assumptions, FE is eligible for producing
a causal probability space. By Fact (25), D⊆E. And by Fact (28), if
e∈E/D, then e >∀ D ∨ e SLR D. Thus, FD is representable in FE. It is
then immediate to see that the rep of cc(A  ai)∈AD in FE is the set:
{cc(A ∪B ai ∪ bj) | j 6 J}. We thus have:
pr(A ai) = µC(cc(A ai)) = µD(cc(A ai)) =
µE(
⋃
{cc(A ∪B ai ∪ bj) | j 6 J}) =
∑
j 6 J
µE(cc(A ∪B ai ∪ bj)), (9)
14Since the singleton of cc(A ai) belongs to FC , and not cc(A ai) itself, we should
write µC({cc(A ai)}); to avoid eyestrain, we neglect the curly brackets.
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where the last equation follows from the fact that the singleton of each cc(A∪
B ai∪bj) is an atom of FE. Consider finally set G: clearly, G⊆E, so if E
is eligible for producing a causal probability space, so is G. By an argument
exactly like the one at the beginning of this paragraph, FG is representable
in FE. And clearly, {(cc(A ∪ B  ai ∪ bj)}∈FG has the representative
{(cc(A ∪B ai ∪ bj)}∈FE. Hence:
µE(cc(A∪B ai∪bj)) = µG(cc(A∪B ai∪bj)) = pr(A∪B ai∪bj).
(10)
The last equation follows from the Definition (19) of propensities. Combining
equations (9) and (10) above, we get this rule on calculating propensities in
models satisfying rather special conditions:
Fact 29 Let each {A ai | i6I} and {B bj | j6J} be a set of exclusive
alternative transitions of the same st-location and ai consistent with bj for
every i 6 I, j 6 J . Let each Ei := pcl(A ai) be eligible for producing a
causal probability space and H[A] = H[B]. Then
pr(A ai) =
∑
j 6 J
pr(A ∪B ai ∪ bj). (11)
6 Towards an Adequate Statement of Prob-
abilistic Funny Business
Having seen how to calculate propensities in causal probability spaces satis-
fying a rather particular condition, we now turn towards formulating a condi-
tion to the effect that two transitions, with SLR initials, are probabilistically
independent, or (in the BST terminology), do not constitute probabilistic
funny business (PFB). For our search of a proper condition, it is instructive
to note that under the particular circumstances assumed in the last section,
sets of causae causantes of two transitions do not overlap.
Fact 30 Let each {A ai | i6I} and {B bj | j6J} be a set of exclusive
alternative transitions of the same st-location such that every ai is consistent
with every bj. Then
pcl(A ai) ∩ pcl(B bj) = ∅.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there is e∈ pcl(A ai)∩ pcl(B bj),
which entails e <∃ ai ∧ e <∃ bj. There are now two cases:
(i) H〈ai〉 ⊥e H〈bj〉, from which it follows that ai and bj are inconsistent, which
contradicts the assumption.
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(ii) there is some history h such that h 6∈H〈ai〉, h 6∈H〈bj〉, h ⊥e H〈ai〉 and
h ⊥e H〈bj〉. But, since e∈ pcl(A  ai) and e∈h, it must be that A ⊂ h,
and then by Exclusiveness, h∈H〈ak〉 for some k6 I. By the condition of the
same st-location of Definition 20: e <∃ ak, and hence H〈ak〉 ⊥e H〈bj〉, from
which inconsistency of ak and bj follows, contradicting the assumption.
The immediate consequence is no overlap of the respective sets of
causae causantes:
Fact 31 Let each {A ai | i6I} and {B bj | j6J} be a set of exclusive
alternative transitions of the same st-location such that every ai is consistent
with every bj. Then
cc(A ai) ∩ cc(B bj) = ∅.
What would be a proper statement of the probabilistic independence of
two transitions A  a and B  b, each belonging to a different set of
exclusive alternative transitions of the same st-location, subject to an extra
condition that H[A] = H[B]? By Facts (27) and (31), if causal probability
space associated with E = pcl(A ∪B ai ∪ bj) is uncorrelated and H[A] =
H[B], the following obtains:
∏
e∈ pcl(Aai)
µ{e}(e Πe〈ai〉) ·
∏
e∈ pcl(Bbj)
µ{e}(e Πe〈bj〉) =∏
e∈ pcl(A∪Bai∪bj)
µ{e}(e Πe〈ai ∪ bj〉) =
µpcl(A∪Bai∪bj)(cc(A ∪B ai ∪ bj)).
(12)
Combining this equation with the formula for propensities and Equa-
tion (11), we get this definition of a special case of probabilistic independence
(or of No PFB):
Definition 32 (probabilistic independence, special case) Let A  a
and B  b be transitions from initial events to scattered outcome events
and a be consistent with b and H[A] = H[B]. Then A  a and B  b are
probabilistically independent iff
pr(A a) · pr(B b) = pr(A ∪B a ∪ b).
The immediate consequence of this definition and Equation 12 is the
following fact:
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Fact 33 Let A a and B b be transitions from initial events to scattered
outcome events and a be consistent with b and H[A] = H[B]. Then A 
a and B  b are probabilistically independent if the probability measure
µpcl((A∪Ba∪b) is uncorrelated.
This definition, although useful in analysis of an EPR-style set-up of
Section (3), is not applicable to the Bell-Aspect experiment, because of the
assumption H[A] = H[B]. In the experiment, a measurement event in one wing
may occur together with each of a few measurement events in the other wing.
Thus, we need to remove this assumption. As a consequence of relaxing the
above condition, we need something like a “conditional propensity,” since we
will now investigate, let’s say, the propensity of transition A  ai, on the
supposition that B occurs. It is not immediately clear how this concept can
be related to causal probability spaces, since B is not even a transition, so
there is no room for it in an event algebra of a causal probability space.
The propensity of I  O conditional on initial J (written as pr(I  O |
J)) should be derived from the set of only those elements of the set T˜pcl(IO)
of the alternative basic transitions that do not prohibit the occurrence of J .
In other words, we need to take into account only those elements of T˜pcl(IO)
that are consistent with J . Given No MFB, every transition from T˜pcl(IO),
whose initial is not below some element of J is consistent with J . As for
t∈ T˜cc(IO), whose initial is below some element of J , it is consistent with J
only if it belongs to the set cc(I  O) of causae causantes and J is consistent
with O. Now, if all inconsistent alternative basic transitions with the same
initial e <∃ J are removed from the set T˜cc(IO), in the “pruned” set T˜ there
will only be a single basic transition with initial e, namely one belonging to
cc(I  O). Clearly, a basic transition unaccompanied by its alternatives
in the “pruned” set T˜cc(IO) has no probabilistic consequences. Hence, in
constructing a casual probability space for propensity conditional on J , we
remove from pcl(I  O) all its elements that lie below some element of J .
Then in the usual way, we build a sample space out of maximal consistent
subsets of the set of basic transitions, whose initials lie in the pruned set.
From these considerations, the following recipe emerges for the construc-
tion of a causal probability space for conditional propensity pr(I  O | J):
Consider set E = {x∈ pcl(I  O) | x 6<∃ J}. Construct the complete set T˜
of alternative basic transitions that have initials in E. As the sample space
AE take the set of all maximally consistent subsets of T˜ . Then in a familar
way define the event algebra FE and probability measure µE. The sought
probability space is now the triple 〈AE, FE, µE〉. Conditional propensity is
then defined as follows:
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Definition 34 For transition I  O from initial I to scattered outcome O,
its propensity conditional on initial J , pr(I  O | J), where J is consistent
with O, is the following:
pr(I  O | J) = µE(ccJ(I  O)),
where E = {x∈ pcl(I  O | x 6<∃ J} and t∈ ccJ(I  O) iff t∈ cc(I  O)
and i(t) 6<∃ J .
Next we have these facts relevant to conditional propensities:
Fact 35 Let A  a and B  b be transitions to scattered outcomes such
that a and b are consistent. Then:
if t∈ ccB(A a), then t∈ cc(A ∪B → a ∪ b), (13)
where ccB(A a) = {t∈ cc(A a) | i(t) 6<∃ B}.
Proof: For the implication above to fail, there must be t = {e} H such
that for some h∈H[A]: h ⊥e H〈a〉 and e 6<∃ B, but (†) for every h′ ∈H[A] such
that h′ ⊥e H〈a〉, h′ 6∈H[B]. Since a is consistent with b, e and B are consistent
as well. Given this consistency, e 6<∃ B means: ∀x : (x∈B → (e SLR x ∨
x6 e)). Consider now two subsets that partition B: B1 = {x∈B | x SLR e}
and B2 = {x∈B | x 6 e}. Clearly, e SLR B1. By No MFB, there is
h∗ ∈Πe〈h〉 ∩ H[B1]. Hence B1⊆h∗ and (since e∈h∗) B2⊆h∗, so B⊆h∗.
From e∈h∗, it also follows that A⊆h∗. And since h∗ ≡e h, it must be that
h∗ ⊥ H〈a〉. Contradiction with (†). 
The immediate consequence of this implication and Fact (24)15 is that,
for ccB(A  a) = {t∈ cc(A  a) | i(t) 6<∃ B} and symmetrically for ccA,
the following is true:
ccB(A a) ∪ ccA(B b) = cc(A ∪B a ∪ b). (14)
Accordingly, if we frame the notion of probabilistic independence in terms of
conditional propensities as defined above, and require further that
ccB(A  a) ∩ ccA(B  b) = ∅, we get that A  a and B  b are
probabilistically independent if the relevant causal probability measure is
uncorrelated—see the fact below. This motivates the following definition of
probabilistic funny business.
15Additionally one needs to observe that if e∈ pcl(A∪B ai∪bj), then ¬(e <∃ A∪B).
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Definition 36 (probabilistic funny business) Transitions A → a and
B → b (where A and B are initial events and a, b scattered outcomes) are
a case of probabilistic funny business (PFB) iff
1. A SLR B;
2. a ∪ b is a scattered outcome;
3. cc(A→ a) ∩ cc(B → b) = ∅ (causal separation);
4. pr(A→ a | B) · pr(B → b | A) 6= pr(A ∪B → a ∪ b).
With this definition, we have a desired fact: if the basic transitions are
uncorrelated, then (if two transitions are causally separated, then they do
not constitute a case of PFB).16
Theorem 37 Let A→ a and B → b be causally separated transitions from
initial events to scattered outcomes such that A SLR B and a∪b is a scattered
outcome. Then if the measure µpcl(A∪Ba∪b) is uncorrelated, A → a and
B → b are not a case of PFB.
Proof. Assume this notation: G = pcl(A ∪ B  a ∪ b), F = {e∈ pcl(A
a) | e 6<∃ B}, E = {e∈ pcl(B  b) | e 6<∃ A}, ccA(B  b) = {t∈ cc(B 
b) | i(t) 6<∃ A}, and ccB(A  a) = {t∈ cc(A  a) | i(t) 6<∃ B}. our
theorem follows from this sequence of equations:
µG(cc(A ∪B a ∪ b)) 1=
∏
t∈ cc(A∪Ba∪b)
µ(i(t))(t)
2
=
∏
t∈ ccA
µ(i(t))(t) ·
∏
t∈ ccB
µ(i(t))(t)
3
= µF (ccA) · µE(ccB),
where
1
= and
3
= hold because basic transitions are uncorrelated, and
2
= be-
cause of Fact (35) (cf. Equation (14)) and causal separation. 
Now, in rather special circumstances, which however are most likely sat-
isfied in the set-up of Bell’s theorem, causal separation of transitions is true.
Fact 38 Let A = {A  ai | i 6 I} be a set of exclusive transitions of the
same st-locations, and B  b be a transition to a scattered outcome such
that ai is consistent with b for every i6I. Then A ai is causally separated
from B b for every i6 I.
16This is an analogue of Mu¨ller’s (2005) Theorem 1.
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Proof. For A  ai and B  b not to be causally separated, there must
be some e∈ pcl(A ai) ∩ pcl(B  b), from which it follows that for some
h1 ∈H[A] : h1 ⊥e H〈ai〉. By exclusiveness condition, for some outcome event
ak of some transition from A: h1 ∈H〈ak〉. Hence e is consistent with ak.
Hence, by same st-location, since e <∃ ai: e <∃ ak. We will now argue
that, contrary to the premise of the fact, ak and b are inconsistent. Pick a
“witness” history h∗ ∈H〈ai〉∩H〈b〉. Observe that for h∈H〈ak〉, since e <∃ ak,
it must be that h ≡e h1, and hence h ⊥e h∗, whereas for h∈H〈b〉, (since
e <∃ b) it must be that h ≡e h∗. Contradiction. 
6.1 Parameter Independence
A crucial premise in Bell’s theorem is that an outcome of a measurement
performed in one wing is to be independent of what is measured in the other
wing, this being the content of Parameter Independence (PI). The present
framework affords it a precise reading: the (conditional) propensity of a
transition A a is the same, no matter whether conditioned on event B or
on B′, where each B and B′ are SLR to A. But is Parameter Independence
true in the present framework?
The answer is that, given certain assumptions, naturally thought to be
satisfied in a Bell’s setup, Parameter Independence is true. To prove a theo-
rem to this effect, let us first observe this fact:
Theorem 39 Let A,B and B′ be initial events and B have the same st-
location as B′. Let also A  a be a transition to scattered outcome a and
a SLR B as well as a SLR B′. Then ccB(A a) = ccB′(A a).
Proof: We need to show that for every e∈ pcl(A a): e 6<∃ B iff e 6<∃ B′.
But since a is SLR to B as well as to B′, by No MFB there are histories
h1 ∈H〈a〉 ∩ H[B] and h2 ∈H〈a〉 ∩ H[B′]. Since H(e)⊆H〈a〉, the two histories
testify that e is consistent with B and e is consistent with B′, respectively.
The equivalence above follows then from same st-location. 
From the theorem it follows that Parameter Independence is true. That
is, if an outcome a of measurement A in one wing of the experiment is SLR to
each alternative measurement selectable in the other wing, then this outcome
is independent, propensity-wise, from measurements in the other wing. More
precisely, we have: pr(A a | B) = pr(A a | B′).
As it stands, the proof of the theorem depends on the same st-location
of B and B′, which means of course that the two events are inconsistent.
This suggests a possibility of proving the same conclusion from a different
set of premises, in which same st-location of B and B′ is replaced by the
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assumption that they are inconsistent, and the selection between them is
affected by some “nicely” located selection event(s). For scarcity of space,
however, we do not prove this theorem here, leaving the task to the reader.
7 Bell-Aspect Experiment
The experiment that Clauser, Shimony, Horne and Holt (1969) envisaged was
carried out by Aspect and his team in 1980–1981. It seems to involve two
levels of chanciness: The production of results, a1, a2 on the left and b1 and
b2 on the right, seem to be chancy. And there is (apparently) freedom in the
selection of settings on the apparatus to the left as well as on the apparatus
to the right. We will denote these selection events by SL and SR, respectively.
As a result of the selection on the left, there is either the measurement event
Li or the measurement event Li′, read as the measurement in the left wing
with the setting put to i (i′).17 Similarly on the right, after selection event
SR there is either measurement Rj or measurement Rj
′. To keep track of the
wings and settings, we write Lia for result a of the measurement on the left,
with setting i, and similarly for Li′a,Rjb and Rj′b. As for spatiotemporal
features, a selection event in one wing is space-like related to results occuring
in the other wing, and, consequently, a measurement event performed in one
wing is space-like related to results occurring in the other wing.
Let us now focus on a statistical aspect of the experiment described above.
We assume the idealization that the experiment has infinitely many runs,
and the results obtained on the runs permit one to estimate probabilities of
“joint results,” like pex(Lia ∧Rjb), and probabilities of “single” results, like
pex(Lia). (In total, there are 16 probabilities of the former kind, and 8 of the
latter kind.) But how are the runs of this experiment differentiated? It is
natural to say that the experiment is ‘timed’ by emissions for pairs of particles
from the source. Yet, we will not lose on generality, and avoid a commitment
to ontology of particles, if we postulate that runs of the experiment are
differentiated by the occurrences of pairs of selection events.
To recall, run of the experiment is a modally thick notion, as it involves
measurement events with all possible settings, and all possible results. As for
types of runs, they are differentiated by propensity assignments to the tran-
sitions involved. This has a consequence that although some two occurrences
of, for instance, SL look perfectly similar, they may still belong to different
types of runs, as transitions to some corresponding results occurring in two
17To add some physics, the measurement on the left of the electron’s spin projection on
the direction i (or i′).
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runs obtain different propensities. In a similar vein, two runs are subsumed
to different types because some transition that has not occurred in either of
these runs (this being said from some later point of view), receives different
propensities on these runs.
We list now some properties, idealizations, and desiderata on a run of the
Bell-CH experiment.
Requirements:
1. Li is inconsistent with Li′ and Rj is inconsistent with Rj′;18
2. selection events SL and SR are consistent and SL <∀ Li ∪ Li′, and
SR <∀ Rj ∪Rj′;
3. there are exactly two setting at each wing: ∀h : SL ⊂ h ⇒ Li ⊂
h ∨ Li′ ⊂ h and ∀h : SR ⊂ h⇒ Rj ⊂ h ∨Rj′ ⊂ h;
4. same st-location of alternative measurements: s(Li) = s(Li′), s(Rj) =
s(Rj′), etc.
5. same st-location of alternative outcomes of each measurement:
s(Lia) = s(Lia′), s(Li′a) = s(Li′a′), s(Rjb) = s(Rjb′), and s(Rj′b) =
s(Rj′b′);
6. SLR relations: Lia SLR SR, Li
′a SLR SR, Rjb SLR SL, and Rj′b SLR
SL,
7. exclusiveness: if h∈H[Li], then there is a result a such that h∈H〈Lia〉,
and analogously about Li′, Rj and Rj′.
8. every measurement has three possible results: +, −, and f , where f is
a “failed outcome;” that is: a, b∈{+,−, f}.
9. every outcome of every measurement on the left is consistent with every
outcome of every measurement on the right.
We take it that selection events as well as measurement events are repre-
sented by BST initial events, whereas outcomes are interpreted as scattered
outcome events. Then, as a result of the above conditions, in each run n of the
experiment there are four sets of exclusive transitions of the same st-location
(mind it that a run is a modally thick notion, and runs are differentiated by
occurrences of pairs of selection events):
18Since Lia∪Rjb and the like are scattered outcomes, and Li∪Rj is below it, the latter
is consistent.
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{Lin ∪Rjn Lian ∪Rjbn | a, b∈{+,−, f}} (15)
{Li′n ∪Rjn Li′an ∪Rjbn | a, b∈{+,−, f}} (16)
{Lin ∪Rj′n Lian ∪Rj′bn | a, b∈{+,−, f}} (17)
{Li′n ∪Rj′n Li′an ∪Rj′bn | a, b∈{+,−, f}}. (18)
That is, above the selection SnL ∪ SnR, there are the above four sets of transi-
tions in the model. Yet, every history passing through this selection passes
through exactly one of the initials Lin ∪ Rjn, Li′n ∪ Rjn, Lin ∪ Rj′n and
Li′n ∪Rj′n. Hence, if a history σ in an MBS is to fully represent this exper-
iment, we need to ensure that each of the four types of initials above occurs
in σ sufficiently many times. This follows from conditions (3) and (4) of Def-
inition (6). Note, however, that the first clauses of the above definition need
to be modified, to accommodate alternative measurements, the gist of the
Bell-CH set-up. The general definition of an MBS model fully representing
a statistical experiment adequate for the Bell-CH setup is provided in the
Appendix.
In the literature, the Bell-CH inequality (which is violated by quantum
mechanics and most likely, by Nature as well) is derived from the three “inde-
pendence” premises: Outcome Independence, Parameter Independence, and
No Conspiracy. The first says that outcomes in two wings are probabilis-
tically independent, conditional on the measurement settings and a value
of the hidden variable. The second is the claim that outcome in one wing
is probabilistically independent of the measurement setting selected in the
other, conditional on a value of the hidden variable. The third amounts to
assuming that the measurement settings and values of hidden variables are
probabilistically independent.
As one might expect, a similar bunch of conditions will figure in our BST
derivation of the Bell-CH inequality; there will, however, be some significant
alterations. To draw a link between the two approaches, a value of a hidden
variable is here understood as a type of runs of the experiment. Outcome
Independence (recall, it is conditional on a hidden variable) amounts to No
Probabilistic Funny Business: observe that the latter is supposed to hold in
each type of runs. Parameter Independence presently takes on the following
form:
pr(LiΘ(λ) → LiaΘ(λ) | RjΘ(λ)) = pr(LiΘ(λ) → LiaΘ(λ) | Rj′Θ(λ)), (19)
where Θ(λ) : Λ → N is a “selection function.” Observe that the set-up
considered satisfies the premises of Parameter Independence: points (6) and
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(9) of the description of the set-up imply that every measurement in one wing
is SLR to every outcome in the other wing. And, by clause (4), measurements
in one wing have the same st-location. Hence Parameter Independence is
provably true—cf. Theorem (39). This is the first surprise.
As for the condition of No Conspiracy, it is essential for our proof that
in each run n of the experiment, each setting — Lin, Li′n, Rjn and Rj′n —
is possible. It follows that in every run of every type each setting is possible.
Note that this independence of selected settings and types of runs is modal
and not probabilistic. This is the second surprise.19
The proof of Bell-CH inequalities takes advantage of the arithmetical fact
which states that for any real numbers u, u′, v, and v′ from the [0, 1] interval,
−16 uv + uv′ + u′v′ − u′v − u− v′ 6 0. (20)
Make then these substitutions:
u = pr(LiΘ(λ) → Li+Θ(λ) | RjΘ(λ)) = pr(LiΘ(λ) → Li+Θ(λ) | Rj′ Θ(λ)) (21)
v = pr(RjΘ(λ) → Rj+Θ(λ) | LiΘ(λ)) = pr(RjΘ(λ) → Rj+Θ(λ) | Li′ Θ(λ)) (22)
u′=pr(Li′Θ(λ) → Li′+Θ(λ) | RjΘ(λ)) = pr(Li′Θ(λ)→Li′+Θ(λ) | Rj′ Θ(λ)) (23)
v′=pr(Rj′ Θ(λ)→Rj′+Θ(λ) | Li′ Θ(λ))=pr(Rj′Θ(λ)→Rj′+Θ(λ) | LiΘ(λ)), (24)
where the right-hand side equations rest on Parameter Independence. With
the substitution made, multiply then the sides of Inequality (20) by wλ,
employ No PFB and sum over λ∈Λ. Finally, use Empirical Adequacy con-
dition, that is, clause (4) of Definition (6). The result is the constraint on
observable probabilities— the Bell-CH inequality:
− 16 pex(Li+ ∧Rj+) + pex(Li+ ∧Rj′+) + pex(Li′ + ∧Rj′+)−
pex(Li′ + ∧Rj+)− pex(Li+)− pex(Rj′+)6 0. (25)
The failure of this inequality means that there is no MBS fully represent-
ing the (idealized) statistical Bell-CH experiment, subject to the condition
that outcomes are independent (in the sense that the pairs of corresponding
transitions are not cases of PFB). More precisely, given the above condition,
one cannot satisfy “probabilistic” conditions (1) and (3) of Definition (6).
19In recent papers of Hofer-Szabo´ 2008, Grasshoff, Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2005), and
Portmann and Wu¨thrich (2007) Bell-type inequalities are derived from variously weak-
ened versions of (probabilistic) No Conspiracy. One might thus have a premonition that
probabilistic No Conspiracy is not needed for the proof.
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8 Discussion
The main result of this paper is this: given (1) the assumptions needed
to construct causal probability spaces and (2) the idealizations made in
the construction of propensity-frequentist models for Bell-CH experiment, a
frequentist-propenisty model for Bell-CH that satisfies (i) (non-probabilistic)
No Conspiracy and (ii) No Probabilistic Funny Business (PFB), is not pos-
sible. No Conspiracy requires that in each run n of the experiment, it is pos-
sible to select each Li and Li′ on the left and each Rj and Rj′ on the right.
No PFB is a BST rendition of Outcome Independence. Notably, Parameter
Independence, which is another premise of Bell’s theorem, is unnecessary, as
it is derivable from the assumptions (1) and the idealizations (2), mentioned
above. Thus, given that our world satisfies the assumptions (1) and the
idealizations are “reasonably close to the reality,” there is conspiracy in our
world, or probabilistic funny business, or both. By Theorem 37, probabilistic
funny business implies that the corresponding µ measure is correlated, which
means that some basic transitions, with SLR initials, are correlated.
Since the main result is conditional on the assumptions (1) and the ideal-
izations (2), let us examine them, starting with the former. First, there are
finitistic assumptions in Mu¨ller’s (2005) construction of causal probability
spaces: the underlying set of choice events must be finite, and each element
thereof — finitely splitting. As Mu¨ller himself indicates, there are ways to
remove these limitations. Also, an important Fact 21 has an infinitistic ver-
sion, i.e., with no finitistic assumptions in the premises. Another important
assumption is No MFB. This means that although a joint occurrence of some
SLR results is not observed in an experiment, a BST model of the phenom-
enon nevertheless has histories with the joint occurrence of the two results,
but it has probability zero.
A similar move occurs in the idealizations (2). It is assumed that if some
type-level measurement result a˜ of measurement event A˜ is observed in a
statistical experiment, then in a model, if in the n-th run a corresponding
(token-level) measurement event An occurs, then there is a history in which
both An and an occur. This sounds like a proliferation of possibilities: if a
result is possible, then it is possible in every run in which the corresponding
measurement event occurs. The proliferation is mitigated by probabilities,
however, as the results might have probability zero assigned. Other idealiza-
tions concern spatiotemporal locations of events, yet as we indicated above,
they can be weakened, if one wants, but in my opinion they are still quite
reasonable as they stand.
Thus, as the assumptions are rather weak, and the idealizations either
realistic or cable of being appropriately weakened, we are facing a choice:
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there is conspiracy in our world, or some basic transitions, with SLR initials,
are correlated.
Long live experimental metaphysics!
9 Appendix: General Propensity Models
By comparing a simplified EPR experiment of Section (3) with the Bell-
CH experiment, we have seen that runs of experiments might be counted
differently. Also, we have seen that, since the measurements considered might
be incompatible, it should not be required that all measurement events occur
in a run. This suggests a simplified and abstract approach to be sketched
here.
To begin with, we assume that an experimenter somehow knows how to
count runs of the experiment; suffice it to say that she counts the runs by
natural numbers. Suppose next that our experimenter believes that there
is a finite set X of measurements (type-level) that can be carried out (in-
stantiated), separately or jointly, at each run of the experiment. Let her
further estimate that every X˜ ∈X has a finite set {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜k} of possi-
ble outcomes. Now, to capture this structure of possible measurements and
their possible outcomes, we postulate that for every n∈N there is a set T n
consisting of transitions from possible measurements (token-level) to their
possible outcomes (also token-level) that are available at the nth run. In the
context of Bell-CH, T n should contain usual “measurement” transitions, like
(Li ∪ Rj)n  (Lia ∪ Rjb)n as well as less standard “selection” transitions,
like SnL Lin. First we define what it means when we say that a history in
an MBS weakly (i.e., modally and spatiotemporally) represents a statistical
experiment:
Definition 40 (MBS weakly represents) Consider a statistical experi-
ment in which there is a set X of measurements such that each is possible at
every run and for every X˜ ∈X there is a finite set PX := {x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜k}
of possible outcomes. An MBS M weakly represents this statistical experi-
ment in terms of mapping Y , history σ and sequence T 1, T 2, T 3, . . . of sets
of transitions iff
1. Y is an injective function from the set of triples 〈n, X˜, x˜i〉, where n∈N,
X˜ ∈X and x˜i ∈PX , to the set of transitions from initials to scattered
outcomes in M;
2. InX := {Y (n, X˜, x˜i) | x˜i ∈PX} is the set of alternative exclusive out-
comes of the same st-location;
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3. the sequence T 1, T 2, . . . is shifted in time, where T n =
⋃
X˜ ∈X I
n
X ;
4. for every n∈N , there is at least one t∈T n, whose outcome occurs in
σ.
We say t∈Tm and t′ ∈T n are corresponding transitions iff there is X˜ ∈X
and x˜i ∈PX such that t = Y (〈m, X˜, x˜i〉) and t′ = Y (〈n, X˜, x˜i〉).
Then we define types of runs.
Definition 41 The m-th run and the n-th run belong to the same type of
runs iff for every t∈Tm and t′ ∈T n, if t and t′ are corresponding transitions,
then pr(t) = pr(t′).
Definition 42 (MBS model fully represents) Let M be an MBS that
weakly represents, in terms of mapping Y , history σ and sequence T 1, T 2, T 3, . . .,
a statistical experiment characterized by sets X and {PX}X˜ ∈X. We say that
M represents fully the experiment in terms of Y , σ and propensity assignment
pr iff there is a partition Λ of the set N of natural numbers such that
1. for every l,m∈N : l,m∈λ for some λ∈Λ iff for every t∈T l and
t′ ∈Tm, if t and t′ are corresponding transitions, then pr(t) = pr(t′);
2. pex(x˜) =
∑
λwλpr(Y (〈Θ(λ), X˜, x˜〉)),
where Θ : Λ→ N is a “selection function” such that Θ(λ)∈λ, and
wλ = limn→∞
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ}
n
,
3. for every λ∈Λ:
pr(Y (〈Θ(λ), X˜, x˜〉)) = lim
n→∞
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ ∧ σ ∈H〈x〉}
#{m∈N | m6 n ∧m∈λ} .
Let us write Xn  xn for Y (〈n, X˜, x˜〉). The transitions to consider in
constructing a model of the Bell-CH experiment are the transitions from the
sets of Equations (15)–(18), as well as “selection” transitions: (SL ∪SR)n
(Li ∪ Rj)n, (SL ∪ SR)n  (Li′ ∪ Rj)n, (SL ∪ SR)n  (Li ∪ Rj′)n, and
(SL ∪ SR)n (Li′ ∪Rj′)n. Because selection event (SL ∪ SR)n is below any
other event in any transition from T n, by clause (4) of Definition (40) we get
that (SL∪SR)n occurs in history σ. As the experimenter strives to achieve a
non-zero experimental probability of any combination of settings, in history
σ there must be an infinite number of runs with each combination of settings.
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